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Chapter 3
The Role of 401(k) Accumulations in Providing
Future Retirement Income
Sarah Holden and Jack VanDerhei
At year-end 2004, in aggregate, some 43 million 401(k) plan participants
held more than $2 trillion in 401(k) plan assets.1 Nevertheless, today’s
retirees do not tell us about the future status of workers having had 401(k)
plans available over a full career. This is because the 401(k) plan is just now
turning twenty-five years old, which means that even the oldest current
participants could have only saved in a 401(k) plan for at most, a little over
half of their careers. Thus, the EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection
Model2 was developed to project the proportion of an individual’s prere-
tirement income that might be replaced by 401(k) plan accumulations at
retirement after a full career with availability of 401(k) plans under many
scenarios.
The question of retirement income adequacy involves examining the
potentially several sources of income in retirement: (a) Social Security
benefits, (b) income from defined benefit (DB) and/or defined contribu-
tion (DC) retirement plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs), (c)
income from other individual savings (possibly including housing equity),
and (d) income from continued employment.3 The model in this chapter
only focuses on the income stream future retirees are projected to receive
from 401(k) accumulations, which are the sum of 401(k) balances at all
employers and rollover IRA assets, in the first year of retirement.
Growth of 401(k) Plans
The past quarter century has witnessed a shift in the US pension landscape.
About twenty-five years ago, 401(k) plans had only just come into existence,
DB plans held the bulk of the pension asset base, with over $444 billion,
while DC plans, which were usually supplemental, held $185 billion.4
Today, by contrast, DC plans control $2.7 trillion in assets, and DB plan
assets total $1.8 trillion.5 Significantly, IRAs are also very substantial,
amounting to $3.5 trillion;6 these benefited not only from contributions
and investment returns over time but also from rollover assets from
employer-sponsored plans.7
This dramatic change in the pension landscape has shifted some respon-
sibility for retirement security from plan sponsors to individual partici-
pants. Further, while 401(k) plans have great potential, individual
workers must now take the important steps of participating when offered
a plan, preserving assets while working and on job change, and spending
down assets responsibly in retirement. As a result, it is natural to reflect on
where participation in 401(k) plans might be leading future retirees. This
chapter weaves together two recent trends in pension research8 to examine
whether 401(k) plans will be able to provide retirees with substantial
retirement income under a range of scenarios. In addition, following
Holden and VanDerhei (2002), the chapter assesses the role that plan
design plays in shaping the different outcomes. We begin by briefly
describing the EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model and
then present baseline results reflecting continuous employment, continu-
ous coverage by 401(k) plans, and historical market returns (based on the
performance of US financial markets from 1926 through 2001). Next we
modify the model to explore the impact of catch-up contributions, con-
tributing to IRAs if a worker is not offered a 401(k) plan, and changing the
retirement age.
Methodology
The key elements of the EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model
are sketched in Figure 3-1.9 The starting point for the model is to collect
data on 401(k) plan participants’ account balances at their current em-
ployers, asset allocations, loan balances, and annual incomes (at year-end
2000) using the EBRI/ICI database.10 The model then projects partici-
pants’ plan activity over the remainder of their careers, which varies as a
function of personal characteristics and typical behaviors observed among
millions of 401(k) participants at different ages, tenures, and income levels
(based on our analysis of the EBRI/ICI database). For example, asset
allocations are adjusted as participants age, because in the cross-sectional
data we see that older participants tend to hold lower percentages of their
account balances in equities compared with younger ones. However, indi-
viduals’ risk profiles vary. Thus, those with more of their accounts in
equities at year-end 2000 relative to others in their age group are assumed
to continue to hold higher equity allocations over their careers, albeit
with some rebalancing away from equities as they age. Further, the group
of 401(k) participants also engages in behaviors typical at job change.
If a job change is predicted to occur, the model determines whether
the individual leaves his balance in his employer’s plan, cashes it out, or
rolls it over into an IRA. If a rollover IRA is created, then typical
IRA behaviors are modeled including asset allocation decisions and IRA
withdrawal activity.
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Start at year-end 2000:
401(k) Account balance
Asset allocation
Loan balance
Annual income
Contributions?
Amount contributed?
Loans?
Amount borrowed?
401(k) Withdrawal?
Amount withdrawn?
Asset allocation
Rebalance portfolio
Investment returns
Change jobs?
Leave balance, cash out, or
roll over?
Rollover IRA? Asset
allocation, investment
returns, IRA withdrawals?
Participant
activity inside
the 401(k) plan
Participant
behavior
over working
career
Figure 3-1. Diagram of basic elements of the EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation
Projection Model.
Source: EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model (see Holden and VanDer-
hei 2002).
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To evaluate a full career with exposure to 401(k) plans, we first present
results for participants born 1965–74 (age 26–35 in 2000); they will turn age
65 between 2030 and 2039. The 401(k) accumulation value at the end of
each individual’s career represents the sum of all 401(k) balances at all
employers as well as IRA balances resulting from the 401(k) experience.
We also convert the accumulations into an income stream—an annuity or
set of installment payments—using current life expectancies at the retire-
ment age indicated (in most cases, age 65) and projected discount rates.
Finally, replacement rates are calculated to compare benefit payments in
the first year of retirement to each worker’s projected final five-year average
preretirement income.11
Baseline Results
In the model’s baseline run we move participants through a career with
continuous employment, continuous 401(k) plan coverage, and financial
market returns as characterized by the experience in US financial markets
from 1926 through 2001.12,13 In this case, 401(k) accumulations are
projected to replace a significant fraction of projected preretirement in-
come. For example, Figure 3-2 shows that the median retiree in the lowest
income quartile attaining age 65 between 2030 and 2039 (based on pro-
jected final five-year average preretirement salary) will have a 401(k) payout
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Figure 3-2. Median replacement rates for participants turning 65 between 2030 and
2039, by income quartile at age 65.
*The 401(k) accumulation includes 401(k) balances at employer(s) and rollover
IRA balances.
Source: EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model.
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in the first year of retirement that replaces about half of preretirement
earnings. The median retiree in the highest income quartile at age 65 is
projected to replace about two-thirds of projected preretirement income
using 401(k) accumulations.14
For comparison, the median individual in the lowest income quartile
would anticipate projected social security benefits worth 52 percent of
projected preretirement income at age 65, if the current benefit structure
were maintained.15 Social security replacement rates decline with income,
by design, so the median highest income quartile worker would have social
security replace only 16 percent of projected preretirement income (if the
current benefit structure is maintained). As mentioned earlier, 401(k)
accumulation replacement rates tend to rise with income.
Alternative Simulations
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA) increased contribution limits and also permitted catch-up con-
tributions by individuals age 50 or older. Specifically, workers age 50 or
older who were already at the tax-deferred contribution limit were now
allowed to make additional catch-up contributions. The first simulation
examines the impact of this increased saving opportunity, in addition to
having already included the legislated limit increases. We also evaluate
scenarios where workers contribute to IRAs as they would have to their
401(k) plans during times when they do not find 401(k) coverage, follow-
ing suggestions in the literature (Ippolito 1997; Pence 2002) that 401(k)
plan participants may differ from other workers in that they are ‘savers’.16
An additional projection simulation combines the IRA contribution scen-
ario and catch-up contributions in both IRAs and 401(k) plans. Finally, we
allow some flexibility in selecting a retirement date, by exploring the
impact of retiring at 60, versus postponing retirement until age 67 or 70.
Impact of the Catch-Up Provisions. In part because life-cycle analysis has
suggested that older individuals are able to save more,17 EGTRRA created
catch-up contributions for individuals age 50 or older to allow them
additional contributions if they had already reached the tax-deferred
participant contribution limit.18 The model assumes that any individual
age 50 or older who would have contributed at the limit in the simulation in
any given year (after 2001), will also make a catch-up contribution of the
entire amount allowed, as seen in Figure 3-3.19
Holden et al. (2005) find that households taking advantage of IRA catch-
up contributions, did so to the limit.20 Thus, we assumed that 401(k) plan
participants making catch-up contributions contribute the entire amount
allowed;21 we do not account for participants constrained from reaching
the 402(g) limit by either plan design or nondiscrimination testing and
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thus do not recognize them as eligible to make catch-up contributions.22 In
reality, such individuals would be eligible for catch-up.
As one would expect, because highly compensated employees are more
likely to be at contribution limits, higher replacement rates are primarily
observed among the fourth income quartile when catch-up contributions
are modeled. As shown in Table 3-1, this boosts the projected replacement
rate of the median individual in the fourth income quartile by 3.1 percent-
age points. The impact on the median individual in the other income
quartiles is indistinguishable from zero.23
Impact of Saving in IRAs When 401(k) Plan Not Available. The baseline
case assumes that workers always have a 401(k) plan, but replacement rates
fall significantly if this assumption is relaxed. For example, as seen in
Figure 3-4, the baseline replacement rate from 401(k) accumulations for
the median lowest income quartile worker is about 51 percent of projected
preretirement income, which falls to 25 percent if 401(k) coverage is not
continuous and no other plan is allowed to take its place. Table 3-1 shows
that the reduction in replacement rates rises with income, reaching 37
percentage points among the highest income quartile.
Next we examine the impact of modeling saving through IRAs, if employ-
ees find that their employers do not offer a 401(k) plan. Because workers are
assumed to use the IRA only when a 401(k) plan is unavailable, the model
uses the 401(k) contribution decision variables to determine whether a
contribution will be made to an IRA when the individual does not have access
to a 401(k) plan. We assume that each individual tries to contribute to the IRA
what would have been contributed to the 401(k) plan by the employee and
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Figure 3-3. Internal Revenue Code deferred contribution limits in 401(k) plans,
2001–2006.
*After 2006, these limits are indexed for inflation in $500 increments.
Source: Authors’ Summary of US Internal Revenue Code.
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employer combined, taking into account the lower IRA contribution limits,
which are shown in Figure 3-5. Thus, individuals will be constrained to
contribute the minimum of what would have been contributed in a given
year in a 401(k) and what they are allowed to contribute to an IRA.
Interestingly, contributing to an IRA if an employer plan is not available
almost moves workers in the lowest income quartile back to baseline
results. This is because the 401(k) plan contribution amounts among
lower income quartiles are closer to the IRA limits, and thus these individ-
uals are better able to replicate their 401(k) contribution activity in an IRA,
as seen in Figure 3-4. For those in the higher income quartiles, lower
Table 3-1 Change in Median Replacement Rates from 401(k) Accumulations*
Income Quartile
1 2 3 4
Assuming always have contributions to
401(k) plan account
9.1 8.9 6.5 4.6
Assuming all 50þ’s contributing at the
402(g) limit take advantage of catch-up
(***) (***) (***) 3.1
Assuming loans are never taken from
401(k) plan account
0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
Assuming preretirement withdrawals are
never taken from 401(k) plan account
6.7 6.0 6.0 3.8
Assuming do not always have 401(k) plan
coverage
25.7 29.1 32.6 37.1
Assuming contribute to IRAs when don’t
have 401(k) coverage
0.1 3.7 11.9 23.6
Assuming catch-up in IRA and 401(k) plans 0.1 2.6 10.3 21.5
Assuming never cash out balance at job
change
13.3 9.1 6.8 4.7
Assuming preretirement withdrawals are
never taken from IRA balances
11.1 12.8 14.8 18.4
Memo: Median replacement rates for typ-
ical 401(k) participant**
50.7 54.0 59.5 67.2
Source: Authors’ computations using the EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model.
Notes: Relative to baseline model assumptions for participants reaching age 65 between
2030 and 2039, by income quartile at age 65 (percentage points)
* Change in median replacement rate for 401(k) accumulations relative to final five-year
average salary. This is the first-order difference and does not take into account changes in
participant behavior that might occur as result of changing the activity in question.
** The ratio of the income generated in the first year of retirement from 401(k) accumu-
lations to final five-year average salary (in percent) for the baseline model.
(***) Indistinguishable from zero.
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IRA limits prevent them from replicating their 401(k) contributions; for
example, the median replacement rate for the highest earning group
improves by about 14 percentage points, to 44 percent of preretirement
income, but it does not attain the baseline result. Allowing catch-up con-
tributions in addition to the availability of IRAs moves the projected re-
placement rate among higher income participants up a bit.
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Figure 3-4. Median replacement rates from 401(k) accumulations* for participants
turning 65 between 2030 and 2039, by income quartile at age 65.
*The 401(k) accumulation includes 401(k) balances at employer(s) and rollover
IRA balances
Source: EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model.
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Figure 3-5. Internal Revenue Code traditional IRA contribution limits, 2001–2008.
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Impact of Changing Retirement Date. Participants in 401(k) plans have
flexibility in selecting a retirement age;24 furthermore, when employer
contributions are provided, working longer is often a financially attractive
proposition. Accordingly, we vary the retirement age from the baseline
model, which assumes retirement occurs for everyone at age 65. By varying
retirement across ages 60, 67, and 70, we find that the compounding of
investment returns at the end of an individual’s career produces important
differences in replacement rates.
For instance, Figure 3-6 shows that working two extra years from age 65 to
age 67 increases the projected replacement rate in the first year of retirement
of the lowest income quartile by about 6 percentage points, from 51 percent of
preretirement income to 57 percent. The projected replacement rate of the
highest income quartile rises by about 10 percentage points. Working until
age 70 increases replacement rates even more dramatically. On the other
hand, retiring five years earlier reduces projected replacement rates.
Conclusions
Current retirees’ 401(k) accumulations are not representative of what a full
career with exposure to 401(k) plans might generate for retirees. Thus, the
EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model simulated several pro-
jected retirement scenarios for a group of 401(k) plan participants born
between 1965 and 1974 after essentially a full career’s exposure to 401(k)
plans. The simulations suggest that catch-up contributions, which are
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Figure 3-6. Median replacement rates from 401(k) accumulations* for participants
born between 1965 and 1974 at the retirement age indicated, by income quartile at
retirement age indicated.
*The 401(k) accumulation includes 401(k) balances at employer(s) and rollover
IRA balances.
Source: EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model.
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available to participants who are age 50 or older and already contributing at
the limit, primarily help higher income participants increase their replace-
ment rates, while use of IRAs during lapses in 401(k) coverage is more
successful at making lower income participants whole. Postponing retire-
ment tends to increase replacement rates.
Endnotes
1. At year-end 2004, IRAs held $3.5 trillion in assets, with some of those monies
coming from employer-sponsored retirement plans including 401(k) plans (as
rollovers). See Investment Company Institute (ICI 2005). Estimate of number
of 401(k) plan participants from Cerulli Associates (2004).
2. The EBRI/ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model was developed as part of
an ongoing collaborative effort between the Employee Benefit Research Institute
(EBRI) and the Investment Company Institute (ICI). In this ongoing research
effort, known as the EBRI/ICI Participant-Directed Retirement Plan Data Collec-
tion Project, EBRI and ICI have gathered data from some of their members that
serve as plan recordkeepers. The data include demographic information, annual
contributions, participant account balances, asset allocations, and loan balances.
The year-end 2003 EBRI/ICI database contained information on 15 million
401(k) plan participants, in 45,152 plans, holding $776 billion in assets (Holden
and VanDerhei 2004).
3. Here we do not address the issue of retirement income adequacy. For a recent
summary of changes in consumption and income in retirement, see Hurd and
Rohwedder (2005). There is an extensive research literature that analyzes
whether DC plans will be able to provide workers with significant retirement
income. Many of these research papers find favorably for 401(k) plans in many
instances. For example, Poterba (2004) finds that although retirement wealth
in 401(k) accounts is reduced by the deferred tax liabilities, a 401(k) with an
employer match consistently has a higher rate of return than any other type of
account considered. Samwick and Skinner (2004) conclude that 401(k) plans
are as good or better than DB plans in providing for retirement. Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2004) find that 401(k) plan participation has a positive effect on
wealth. Other research recognizes the potential of the DC plan structure, but
points to human foibles and mistakes that prevent workers from reaching the
most beneficial outcome. For example, Munnell and Sunde´n (2004) emphasize
the practical changes in workers’ participation, contribution, asset allocation,
loan, and withdrawal decisions that must be made to ensure the potential of
401(k) plans is realized. While Hurst (2003) concludes that households who
entered retirement with lower-than-predicted wealth generally engaged in near-
sighted consumption during their working lives. Scholz et al. (2004) conclude
that fewer than 20 percent of households have less retirement wealth accumu-
lated than their optimal targets. Other related research includes: VanDerhei
and Copeland (2004); Butrica and Uccello (2004); Engen et al. (1999, 2004a,
2004b); US Social Security Administrations Modeling Income in the Near Term
(MINT) projections (Butrica et al. (2003/2004) and Toder et al. (2002));
Shackleton (2003); Fore (2003); Poterba et al. (2003); Poterba et al. (2001);
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Scholz (2001); Uccello (2001); Steuerle et al. (2000); Montalto (2000); Moore
and Mitchell (2000); Yuh et al. (1998); and Smith (1997).
4. See US Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration
(2004).
5. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005).
6. See Investment Company Institute (2005).
7. For a history of IRAs, see Holden et al. (2005).
8. For a summary of recent retirement saving research, see Holden and VanDer-
hei (2004).
9. For a complete description of the model, see Holden and VanDerhei (2002 and
Appendix).
10. See Holden and VanDerhei (2002 and Appendix) for references on the EBRI/
ICI 401(k) Accumulation Projection Model.
11. The 401(k) distributions are not indexed to inflation over retirement, while
social security payments are. In addition, if the individual elects a set of install-
ment payments rather than an annuity, the amount that may be reasonably
withdrawn each year after the first year may vary as future market fluctuations
affect the account going forward.
12. In the projection model, the future equity returns are assumed to be similar to
historical returns experienced by the S&P 500 between 1926 and 2001 (see
‘large company stocks total returns’ in Ibbotson 2002). Between 1926 and 2001,
about two-thirds of the time, equity returns in any given year have fluctuated
between 7 and 33 percent. The total return used for bonds, GICs, money
market funds, and other investments in the projection was based on ‘long-term
government bonds total returns’ from the beginning of 1926 to the end of 2001
(Ibbotson 2002). Historically, about two-thirds of the time, these returns in any
given year have fluctuated between 1 and 14 percent.
13. Holden and VanDerhei (2002) also consider projections for many different
investment return scenarios including: the worst 50-year return period for US
equities (1929–1978); a bear market (three consecutive years of 9.3 percent
annual returns on equities) at the beginning, middle, or end of individuals’
careers; and a bull market (three consecutive years of þ31.2 percent annual
returns on equities) at the beginning, middle, or end of individuals’ careers.
14. Among participants reaching age 65 between 2030 and 2039, the real (in 2000
dollars) cut-off points for the income quartiles are: first quartile—$36,700;
second quartile—$56,400; and third quartile—$87,200. Thus, individuals in
the highest income quartile at age 65 have a real income of $87,200 or more.
15. Technically, this is called the primary insurance amount (PIA). The PIA was
calculated for the individual participant’s earnings history and did not consider
the possibility of a spousal benefit, which can be substantially larger than an
individual’s own benefit in some cases. The PIA calculated for each individual is
the sum of three separate percentages of portions of their average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME). The portions depend on the year in which the
worker reaches retirement. For example, for 2005 the PIA was 90 percent of
the first $627 of their AIME plus 32 percent of their AIME over $627 and
through $3,779 plus 15 percent of their AIME over $3,779 (see the Social
Security Administration’s website for benefit formulas).
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16. Pence (2002) finds that 401(k) plan participants have greater interest in saving
compared with other workers, and Ippolito (1997) argues that firms that offer
DC plans attract workers who are savers.
17. The life-cycle pattern of saving suggests that older individuals are able to save at
higher rates because they no longer face the expenses of raising children or buying
a home. An augmented version of the life-cycle theory predicts that the optimal
savings pattern increases with age. For a summary discussion of life-cycle models,
see Browning and Crossley (2001). For a more detailed discussion, see Engen et al.
(1999). In addition, Mitchell and Utkus (2004) discuss life-cycle savings and
behavioral financemodels inthecontextof retirementplandesignconsiderations.
18. See Mitchell et al. (this volume) and Holden and VanDerhei (2001) for discus-
sions of nondiscrimination and other contribution limits.
19. The model assumes that all 401(k) plans allow catch-up contributions. Profit
Sharing/401(k) Council of America (PSCA 2004) reports that nearly all mem-
ber plans allowed catch-up contributions in 2003. Utkus and Mottola (2005)
report that 86 percent of 401(k) plans in Vanguard’s recordkeeping system
offered catch-up contributions in 2004.
20. On the other hand, Utkus and Mottola (2005) report an estimated average
401(k) catch-up contribution of $2,207 in 2004 (out of $3,000 possible), de-
rived from total employee 401(k) contributions.
21. While assuming full catch-up contributions may overstate the impact, limiting
the catch-up contributions to participants already contributing at the 402(g)
limit reduces the modeled impact. This is because many 401(k) plan partici-
pants wanting to contribute at the 402(g) limit are prevented from doing so.
For example, in 1999, only 11 percent of participants making contributions
were at the 402(g) limit, but, among those not contributing at the limit, 52
percent could not have done so because of formal plan-imposed limits; see
Holden and VanDerhei (2001).
22. PSCA (2004) reports that 8.6 percent of their member plans limit the contri-
butions of highly compensated participants by plan design; 9.3 percent of plans
limited contributions of highly compensated employees when contributions
reached the maximum allowed by the nondiscrimination tests; and another
18.8 percent of plans returned excess contributions to participants after the
plan year ended.
23. Utkus and Mottola (2005) also find that participants with higher income are more
likely to take advantage of catch-up contributions, although they identify catch-up
contribution activity across participants who are 50 or older in all income groups.
24. Munnell et al. (2003) and Friedberg and Webb (2003) explore how the shift in
pension coverage toward DC plans may be a factor that affects the timing of
retirement. Chan and Stevens (2003) examine the influence of financial factors
on the timing of retirement.
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